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Abstract:  
We estimate the effect of pension reforms on households’ expectations of retirement 
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pension reforms as a source of exogenous variation in expected pension wealth. The Survey 
of Household Income and Wealth, a large random sample of the Italian population, elicits 
expectations of the age at which workers expect to retire and of the ratio of pension benefits to 
pre-retirement income between 1989 and 2002. We find that workers have revised 
expectations in the direction suggested by the reform and that there is substantial offset 
between private wealth and perceived pension wealth, particularly by workers that are better 
informed about their pension wealth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In all industrialized countries pension benefits represent a major component of retirement 
income, and therefore social security arrangements can have important effects on households’ 
intertemporal choices. One of the most important issues in this area is to what extent individuals 
perceive and react to changes in pension legislation. Is private wealth a good substitute for 
mandated accumulation in the form of social security contributions? Do people increase their 
saving and labor supply in response to a reduction in pension benefits? 
Answers to these questions usually proceed in two steps. In a first step, researchers estimate 
expected pension wealth, that is, the expected present discounted value of future benefits that 
workers are entitled to. In a second step, expected pension wealth is related to discretionary 
wealth and/or labor supply behavior. Even in the simplest scenarios, estimating future pension 
benefits is a difficult task. For the working population, expected pension wealth depends, among 
other variables, on the age at which workers expect to retire and on the expected ratio of pension 
benefits to pre-retirement earnings (the replacement rate). The standard approach taken in the 
literature is to estimate these variables from current and projected legislation on pension 
eligibility rules, accrual rates of contributions, productivity growth and mortality projections. In 
this paper we instead take a different approach: we compute expected pension wealth by using 
individual expectations of retirement age and replacement rate. 
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large representative survey of the 
Italian population carried out by the Bank of Italy, elicits retirement age and replacement rate 
expectations from 1989 to 2002. This is not the only survey eliciting such expectations but, to our 
knowledge, it is the only survey in which this information is available for an extended period 
spanning a set of intense pension reforms. During the period, the Italian government enacted 
three reforms (in 1992, 1995, and 1997), whose ultimate effect was to increase the retirement age 
and to reduce the replacement rate of young workers relative to older cohorts.  
The availability of individual expectations enables us to assess the degree of workers’ 
information by comparing the expected replacement rate to a replacement rate computed with the 
relevant pension legislation (for a given retirement age). Moreover, the pension reforms that take 
place in the observation period provide us with the opportunity to estimate the impact of these 
reforms on individual expectations. In particular, we can analyze whether the groups most 
affected by the reforms have perceived these changes correctly. Believing in the importance of 
subjective expectations to determine individual decisions, we use subjective expectations of 
retirement age and replacement rate to construct a measure of expected pension wealth and we 
relate it to discretionary wealth. We then show that the relationship between expected pension 
wealth and discretionary wealth differs according to the degree of individual information about 
pension legislation and the changes implied by the reform. 
The standard life-cycle hypothesis posits that a change in expected pension benefits should 
offset private wealth one-for-one. This offset is what Feldstein (1974) calls the substitution effect 
− pension wealth crowds out discretionary wealth. There are several potential counter-effects to a 
complete crowding out. Bequest motives, short-sightedness, liquidity constraints, risk associated 
with future reforms, and non-marketable future benefits are among the most cited reasons to 
explain why the offset between private and pension wealth might well be less than one-for-one.   3
But there is another element that plays a major role in our analysis: individual information about 
pensions. Information might be especially important at times of pension reforms, because people 
might not immediately understand how the reform will affect their benefits or because changes in 
expectations occur slowly.  
Feldstein (1974) and Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) pioneered the analysis of the 
displacement effect of pension wealth on national saving using U.S. time series and 
microeconomic data, respectively. Since then, a growing literature has used individual level data 
to provide evidence on the degree of substitution between discretionary accumulation and 
pension wealth in the U.S. and other countries imputing pension wealth from legislation (see 
Gale (1998) and Bernheim (2001)). Existing microeconometric evidence suggests that pension 
wealth crowds out discretionary wealth, but at a rate of considerably less than one-for-one. Other 
related and influential research looks at how pension entitlements affect retirement and labor 
participation decisions of the elderly, and simulates the effects of policy reforms (see Gruber and 
Wise (1999, 2004)). 
Using SHIW data for the years 1989-95, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) exploit the 
changes in pension wealth across cohorts and employment groups induced by the 1992 Italian 
pension reform. They model the response of the change in private wealth relative to income (the 
saving rate) to the level of social security wealth relative to income. This amounts to assuming 
that saving changes permanently when social security wealth changes. In the long run, this 
implies a very large effect of a pension reform on private wealth and the capital stock. 
In this paper, we take the standard approach and relate the level of private wealth (relative 
to income) to the level of social security wealth (relative to income). We look at the combined 
impact of three pension reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997) and rely on an estimate of pension wealth 
based on the expected retirement age and expected replacement rate, rather than computed from 
legislation. 
Given the nature of our data, we are able to distinguish the effect of pension reforms on 
workers’ expectations, and the effect of expectation revisions on discretionary wealth. This 
distinction proves to be an important one for estimating the offset between pension wealth and 
discretionary wealth, since this offset is stronger among workers with more accurate expectations 
of pension provisions than among those with less accurate expectations. In this sense, our 
contribution adds significantly to the debate on individual savings decisions in relation to pension 
reforms by highlighting the importance of information and expectation errors about pension 
provisions. To the extent that expectations will eventually fully adjust to the new pension regime, 
the offset estimated for the group of workers with more accurate expectations gives us an 
estimate of the long run change in the stock of private wealth. 
The paper is therefore also closely related to the literature that analyzes the accuracy of 
subjective expectations of retirement age and social security benefits (see Bernheim (1990), 
Disney and Tanner (1999), Dominitz, Manski and Heinz (2002), and Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2005)). This literature has been concerned with a set of issues, which are, to a large extent, 
preliminary to the analysis of the effect of pension wealth on private wealth accumulation. 
Specifically, it analyses the degree of workers’ knowledge of retirement benefits they are entitled 
to, the relation between planned and actual retirement age, and the determinants of the probability 
distribution of expected retirement age. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the Italian pension reforms of the 
last decade and discusses previous evidence. Section 3 presents the data on expectations of   4
retirement outcomes available in the 1989-2002 SHIW and estimates the impact of pension 
reforms on the expected retirement age and replacement rate, exploiting the variation in the 
impact of the legislation changes on different demographic and economic groups. We also 
evaluate the accuracy of pension expectations by comparing the expected replacement rate with a 
statutory rate. We find that, on average, the expectation error of the replacement rate is about 3 
percentage points, but for 14 percent of the sample the expected replacement rate underestimates 
or overestimates the statutory rate by at least 25 percentage points. After the three pension 
reforms there has been an increase in expectation errors, particularly for the groups most affected 
by the reforms. Workers have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform, but 
the adjustment is far from complete. 
Section 4 relates discretionary wealth to a measure of expected pension wealth constructed 
with expectation data. The empirical estimates suggest an offset between private wealth and 
expected pension wealth of about 50 percent. This, however, results from considerable 
differences between “informed” and “uninformed” workers: the offset coefficient is between –0.4 
and –0.8 in the former group, and between –0.2 and –0.4 in the latter. Section 5 concludes by 
drawing attention to the crucial role of financial information and suggesting that in the coming 
decades a problem of inadequate savings could emerge for the cohorts most affected by the 
reforms and, within this group, for those who are less informed about pension rules. 
 
2. The Italian pension system: a decade of reforms 
 
Until recently, the Italian social security system featured high replacement rates, earnings-
based benefits, indexation of pensions to real earnings and cost of living, generous provisions for 
early retirement, and a large number of social pensions (i.e., old-age income assistance). These 
features of the social security system were gradually implemented and extended during the post-
war period, and especially between 1967 and 1975. The result was that the ratio of pension 
benefits to GNP reached almost 16 percent in 1992, the highest value among industrialized 
countries. 
The late eighties and early nineties saw increasing alarm over the growing imbalance of the 
social security system expressed not only by economists and in official government documents, 
but also in the media. In the second half of 1992 the Amato government presented a fiscal 
package containing a major reform of the social security system. In 1995 Italy underwent a 
second major reform of the social security system, known as Dini reform. Social security 
legislation was further refined in December of 1997 by the Prodi government. 
The main features of the reforms were an increase in the retirement age and minimum 
years of contributions for pension eligibility, abolition of seniority pensions for all those who 
started working after 1995, a gradual reduction in pension benefits, and indexation of pension 
benefits to prices rather than to wages. The three reforms maintained the generous provisions of 
the pre-1992 regime for the relatively old workers, who in 1995 had at least 18 years of 
contributions, and different rules for private employees, public sector employees and self-
employed.   5
Although the current regime combines some features of each of the three reforms, we do 
not detail their specific aspects.
1 In fact, we compare pension regimes and individual expectations 
before the 1992 reform and after the 1997 reform, omitting the transitional years between the 
Amato and Prodi reforms (1992-1997). Our dataset allows us to observe workers in two regimes, 
one with generous provisions (before the Amato reform, or simply the pre-reform period) and one 
– ten years later - with much lower benefits (after the Prodi reform, or the post-reform period), at 
least for some categories of workers. We regard the availability of low frequency microeconomic 
data as a major improvement with respect to previous evidence. 
The top panel of Table 1 compares statutory retirement ages in the pre-1992 regime with 
the post-1997 regime. For brevity we refer to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 
1995 as the “old”, to those with less than 18 years of contributions in 1995 as the “middle aged”, 
and to those who started working after 1995 as the “young”. In the new regime the young are 
entitled to a flexible retirement age (from 57 to 65), subject to incentives. For those already 
working in 1995 (the old and the middle-aged), the reform raises minimum retirement age for old 
age pensions of private sector employees (65 for men and 60 for women), but not for public 
employees and self-employed. For the old and middle aged, the reform raises minimum years of 
contributions for both seniority pensions and old age pensions; for the young, whose pension 
award formula is entirely contribution based (see below) the minimum years of contributions is 
just 5 years. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the pension award formula in the pre-1992 regime 
and the post-1997 regime, which we detail here. In the pre-reform regime social security benefits 
were computed according to an earnings-based formula,  R w N ρ , where ρ,  N and  R w  are, 
respectively, the accrual rate, the years of contributions and the average of the last R years of 
salary.
2 The shift to the new regime dramatically altered the pension award formula for new 
cohorts, but retained the main features of the pre-1992 formula for older workers. 
In the post-reform regime pensions are computed distinguishing between three cases: an 
earnings model for the old, a contribution model for the young, and a pro-rata model for the 
middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995). In each case, different rules apply to 
public employees, private employees and self-employed. 
  For older workers, pensions are still computed using the earnings model, and are the sum 
of two components. The first component is R w 92 ρα , where  92 α  is the number of years of 
contributions at the end of 1992. The second component reflects a gradual increase of R to 10 for 
private and public employees and to 15 for the self-employed.
3 In practice, for realistic earnings 
                                                 
1 Brugiavini (1999) provides ample details on the specific features of the sequence of the three Italian pension 
reforms.  
2 The accrual rate was 2 percent for private employees and self-employed, and ranged from 2.2 to 2.5 percent for 
public employees, depending on the years of contribution. R was 5 for private employees, 1 for public employees, 
and 10 for the self-employed. 
3 Namely, for years of contributions between 1992 and 1995, R is increased by 1; for years of contributions between 
1995 and the year of retirement, R is increased by the minimum of 5 and 2/3 of the years of contributions between 
1995 and the year of retirement. For instance, for those retiring in 2000 R is increased by 3; for those retiring in 2005 
it is increased by 5. The second component is therefore ' ' 95 ' 92 95 ) ( ) ( R R w N w α ρ α α ρ − + − , where α95 is years of   6
growth rates, the second component has a small impact on the final pension with respect to the 
pre-reform regime. 
  For the young benefits are computed according to a contribution model, 
∑ + − − − 1
0
1 ) 1 ( N t N
t g w γτ , where τ is the contribution rate and g a 5-year moving average of the 
GDP growth rate. Contributions are proportional to earnings, capitalized on the basis of a 5-year 
moving average, and then transformed in flow benefits using a coefficient (γ), set by legislators, 
that depends on retirement age and life expectancy.
4 Since the contribution rate τ is 33 percent for 
private and public employees and 20 percent for the self-employed, in the new regime the self-
employed will receive substantially lower pensions than employees. The contributions-based 
model has identical minimum retirement age for males and females, in both old age and seniority 
pensions. However, the new regime applies only to the young cohorts, who entered the labor 
market after 1995, and will presumably start to retire after the year 2030. 
For the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995), pensions are 
computed according to a “pro-rata model”: earnings-related for working years before 1995, and 
contributions-related afterwards. 
In Table 2 we provide an example showing how the replacement rate changed after the 
reform. As explained in Table 1, retirement age is not mandatory in Italy, and replacement rates 
depend on years of contributions. To compute replacement rates one therefore needs to make a 
particular choice of retirement age. In the top panel of Table 2 we compute replacement rates for 
somebody retiring at age 60, with 35 years of contributions. The example posits that the growth 
rate of earnings is 2 percent, and that the aggregate GDP growth rate is 1.5 percent. We 
distinguish between three categories of workers (private, public, self-employed), three cohorts 
(old, middle-age, young) and two periods (before and after the reform). The replacement rate is 
defined as the ratio of the first year’s pension to the last year’s earnings.
5 
In the pre-reform regime the replacement rates were the same for old, middle-aged and 
young workers, because the earnings model applied to all. However, in that regime replacement 
rates differed considerably across occupational groups: 67.3 percent for private employees, 81.6 
percent for public employees and 64.1 percent for the self-employed. The higher rates for public 
employees reflect more generous accrual rates and pension award formulas (pensionable earnings 
were just the last salary). 
In the post-reform regime workers are distinguished according to the number of years of 
contributions in 1995. In our example we still posit that each worker plans to retire after 35 years 
of work, but distinguish between an old worker with 25 years of contributions in 1995, a middle-
aged worker with 10 years of contributions in 1995, and a young person who starts working in 
1996. After the reform, the replacement rates of old private employees and self-employed are 
practically unaffected (–1.0 and –0.8 percentage points), while that of old public employees falls 
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4 Currently, γ increases from 4.720 percent for somebody retiring at 57 to 6.136 percent for somebody retiring at 65. 
5 We do not distinguish here between males and females. For given retirement age, they have the same pension 
accrual formula.   7
by 5.1 percentage points. This differential effect is largely due to the reduced accrual rate of 
public employees (from 2.33 to 2 percent). In contrast, middle-aged and especially young 
workers experience a dramatic reduction in replacement rates. For private employees the change 
is –9.1 percentage points for the middle-aged and –12.4 percentage points for the young; for 
public employees, –20.6 and –26.7 percentage points, respectively; and for the self-employed –
22.4 and –30.8 percentage points. 
The example shows that the pension reforms reduced pension benefits for the middle aged 
and the young, and for all cohorts of public employees. The implied magnitudes of change are 
substantial, as for some of the categories involved the replacement rate falls by over 20 
percentage points. Since the replacement rate is a function of the years of contributions, these 
magnitudes of change are sensitive to the choice of retirement age. 
In the lower panel of Table 2 we raise years of contributions and retirement age to 37 and 
62, respectively. The replacement rates are 4 to 5 percentage points higher for each of the groups 
considered, although the changes after the reform are similar. In particular, old private employees 
and old self-employed workers are basically unaffected by the reform. The Italian pension 
reforms therefore provide a quasi-experimental framework to analyze the impact of reforms on 
individual expectations. Since the reform affects some population groups (the middle-aged, the 
young, and public employees) more dramatically than others (old private employees and old self-
employed), we will be able to compare the changes in expectations of different groups of 
individuals before and after the reform. 
 
3. Expectations of retirement outcomes 
 
The life-cycle model of saving assumes perfect information and requires that individuals 
can construct consumption and saving plans. The perfect information assumption is challenged 
on several grounds. On the theoretical side, it has been argued that misinformation can explain 
some of the empirical failures of the standard life-cycle model (Thaler, 1994). The available 
empirical evidence for the U.S. shows that workers are not well informed about their pension 
benefits (Bernheim, 1988; Mitchell, 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989). This lack of empirical 
support for the perfect information assumption motivates a series of studies on the determinants 
of imperfect knowledge of retirement outcomes. 
In general, the literature finds that expectations are informative about retirement outcomes, 
but also uncovers substantial heterogeneity across the population and reveals that many workers 
lack knowledge of the details of their pension plans. The earliest paper is by Bernheim (1990), 
who compares retirement expectations and realizations in the U.S. Retirement History Survey 
and finds that men and wealthier individuals make more accurate plans. Disney and Tanner 
(1999) analyze expectations of retirement age in the U.K. Retirement Survey, and find that 
marital status and education have a significant effect in explaining systematic deviations of 
expectations from outcomes.
6 Lusardi (1999) investigates the effect of unmeasured cost of 
planning on saving and household portfolio choice and shows that households’ wealth holdings 
are quite low before retirement and badly diversified. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) match data 
                                                 
6 The focus of the paper is on the distribution of actual retirement age, conditional on a given expected retirement 
age, rather than on the overall distribution of expectations and realizations.   8
from the Health and Retirement Study with administrative data, and quantify individuals’ 
misinformation on social security benefits. They find only a weak relation between expected 
retirement benefits and benefits estimated on the basis of social security earnings records and 
employers’ descriptions of pension plans. 
In this paper, like most of the recent studies, we use point expectations.
7 We first look at 
expected retirement age and then use this information to focus on expected replacement rate, 
defined as the expected ratio of the first pension to the last salary. For any given expected 
retirement age, the replacement rate is a convenient summary indicator of the generosity of the 
pension system and a good proxy for expected pension wealth. 
The survey – the SHIW - is a large random sample of the Italian population drawn by the 
Bank of Italy every two years. Sample design, interviewing procedure, response rates and a 
comparison between sample and population means are reported in Appendix 2. The survey 
covers several important topics related to retirement and pensions and collects data on the 
subjective assessment of expected retirement age and replacement rate. All workers (public 
employees, private employees, self-employed) are asked the following questions: 
 
•  When do you expect to retire? 
 
•  Think about when you will retire, and consider only the public pension (that is, exclude 
private pensions, if you have one). At the time of retirement, what fraction of labor income 
will your public pension be? 
 
In Italy less than 10 percent of the workers are covered by occupational pension schemes, 
so for the overwhelming majority the social security replacement rate coincides with the overall 
replacement rate. The first question is posed in each survey year from 1989 to 2002; the second 
question only in 1989, 1991, 2000 and 2002. Since we are interested in studying workers’ 
expectations about retirement income, we focus on the group aged 20 to 50 years. This implies 
that we include in our sample individuals born between 1939 (who were 50 years old in 1989) 
and 1982 (20 years old in 2002). The composition of the sample of older workers is likely to 
reflect self-selection into higher expected retirement ages, and so these workers are dropped from 
the analysis. A small number of individuals younger than 20 are also excluded (less than 1 
percent of the sample). We focus on how expectations change after the reform and therefore drop 
workers that are interviewed in the transitional years. 
We define as the pre-reform period the pooled 1989-91 sample, while the post-reform 
period is the pooled 2000-02 sample. Finally, we consider only workers who are employed or 
self-employed in the survey year, excluding the unemployed, retirees and other individuals not in 
the labor force. Overall, we have valid responses on both expected retirement age and expected 
replacement rate for 9,724 males and 5,925 females. 
                                                 
7 Some studies focus on the subjective probability distribution of retirement outcomes, rather than on point 
expectations of retirement age and benefits. Hurd and McGarry (1995) analyze the subjective probability distribution 
of the chance of working full-time past age 62 and of living to age 75 in the U.S. Health and Retirement Study. 
Dominitz, Manski and Heinz (2002) use the Survey of Economic Expectations, which elicits the subjective 
probability distributions of eligibility for social security benefits and of the level of benefits. They report a high 
degree of uncertainty about future benefits even for people only ten years from retirement.   9
As explained in Section 2, the pension reform has different effects depending on whether 
workers had contributed for more or less than 18 years at the end of 1995, and different again for 
those who started working after 1995. The SHIW records the age at which individuals started 
working. This allows us to compute the years of contribution at the end of 1995 for each worker 
and to define our groups accordingly.
8 
 
3.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 3 displays expected retirement age by gender, three occupation groups, and cohort. 
Males expect to retire two years later than females; the self-employed three years later than 
private or public employees. Individuals in the middle-aged group have very similar expected 
retirement age if working in the private or in the public sector, both before and after the reform. 
After the reform, expected retirement age increases for all groups considered, and especially for 
females and the middle-aged. No comparison is possible for the young, who are only observed 
after the reform. The patterns suggest that workers most affected by the reforms understand the 
direction of the changes that have taken place in the pension system.  
Table 4 reports expected replacement rates for males and females in the various 
employment groups and cohorts considered. On average, the rate is high for all groups, reflecting 
the generous provisions of the Italian social security system. The expected replacement rates 
range from 65.3 to 81.8 percent before the reform, and from 57.3 to 79.9 afterwards.  
Before the reform, public employees display the highest expected replacement rate (for 
males, 81.8 for the old, and 80.6 for the middle-aged), reflecting more generous accrual rates for 
this group. The self-employed, which is the group with the least generous pension award formula,  
report the lowest replacement rates (for males, 69 for the old and 71.1 for the middle-aged). On 
average, females expect a replacement rate between 2 and 3 percentage points lower than males, 
consistent with shorter working careers. 
After the reform, expected replacement rates fall for both males and females, and for all 
employment groups considered. For males, the reduction for the middle-aged is stronger than for 
the old, particularly for private employees (where the middle-aged show an 8.4 percentage points 
reduction) and the self-employed (with a 12.2 percentage points reduction); these relatively large 
downward revisions are consistent with the changes introduced by the pension reform. 
Replacement rates also fall for females, but the difference between the old and the middle-aged is 
not as large as that for males. 
The descriptive analysis has two important limitations. First, expectations should be 
compared with their statutory levels. We know from Table 2 that statutory replacement rates 
depend on retirement age, which is a choice variable. We therefore compute a “statutory rate” 
conditioning on a reported expected retirement age. Thus, the statutory rates after the reform 
reflect not only differences in pension rules across groups and pension regimes, but also the 
increase in retirement age documented in Table 3. In order to compare individual expectations to 
                                                 
8 Our imputation procedure assumes no unemployment spells during the working life and is therefore subject to a 
certain amount of measurement error. As a sensitivity check, we assume that each individual starts working and 
contributing at age 20 (or 22) and define years of contribution as current age less 20 (or 22). These alternative 
definitions do not affect any of our results.   10
their statutory counterparts, in Section 3.2 we focus on the determinants of the expectation errors, 
defined as the difference between expected and statutory replacement rates. 
The second limitation is that differences over time in expected replacement rates capture 
not only the effects of the reform but also other economy-wide phenomena.  To compare 
expectations before and after the pension reform, and to account for economy-wide factors 
potentially affecting the various groups over time, in Section 3.3 we use a difference-in-
difference methodology. 
 
3.2. Expectation errors 
  
Table 5 reports the statutory replacement rate evaluated at the average expected retirement 
age for each employment, cohort, and gender group. The patterns in Table 5 are similar to those 
in Table 2, even though in the earlier table the retirement age was exogenously set to 60 or 62. By 
comparing the figures in Table 5 to those in earlier tables, we can assess whether or not 
individuals in particular groups had accurate expectations of their pensions, on average, and also 
whether or not these expectations were revised to accurately reflect the reforms that took place. 
The comparison between Tables 4 and 5 shows that before the reform private employees were, on 
average, overestimating the replacement rate, as were middle-aged workers from all groups with 
the exception of male public employees (who, on average, underestimated the replacement rate). 
After the reform the overestimation of the replacement rate at the average is common to middle-
aged workers across all employment groups.  Group averages, however, hide important within-
group heterogeneity and the literature has shown that expectation errors  are related to variables 
other than employment or cohort. Therefore, we calculate statutory replacement rates for each 
worker, and the corresponding deviation from the expected rate. We then analyze the distribution 
of the expectation error (Figures 1 and 2) and its determinants in a regression framework (Table 
6). 
Figure 1 displays the cross-sectional distribution of the difference between the statutory 
and expected replacement rates before and after the reform (1989-91 and 2000-02, respectively). 
On average, expectation errors are small: workers overestimate the replacement rate by 3.1 
percentage points before the reform, and 3.5 percentage points after.  But for some workers 
expectation errors are large: for about 14 percent of the sample expectation errors are larger than 
25 percentage points, and this is true for more individuals after the reform than before the reform 
(19 and 9 percent of the sample, respectively). Figure 1 shows also that the distribution of 
expectation errors fans out after the reform, which we interpret as an indication that the reform 
has increased uncertainty about retirement rules, at least temporarily. Indeed, the standard 
deviation of the expectation error increases appreciably after the reform, from 16 to 20 
percentage points. 
The unconditional distribution of expectation errors conceals group differences, as shown 
in Figure 2. Examination of the pattern for private employees confirms that this group tends to 
overestimate the replacement rate before the reform but also that after the reform many more 
individuals underestimate the replacement rate and that some make much bigger errors than they 
did before the reform. Public employees before the reform make small expectation errors on 
average but more than 50 percent of individuals either overestimate or underestimate the   11
replacement rate by more than 10 percentage points; the fraction of public employees who 
overestimate the replacement rate increases after the reform. The post-reform period features an 
increase in the standard deviation of the expectation error for all occupation groups, and the 
increase is larger for private employees (from 13 to 18 percentage points) and self-employed 
(from 17 to 24 percentage points) than for public employees (from 15 to 18 percentage points). 
Furthermore, the fraction of respondents that overestimates or underestimates the replacement 
rates by at least 25 percentage points increases for all groups, and particularly for those most 
affected by the reform (from 10 to 14 percent for private employees, from 10 percent to 16 
percent for public employees, and from 11 to 29 percent for the self-employed). 
To explore the determinants of understanding about pension outcomes, we define two 
measures of misinformation: the absolute value of the expectation error, and a dummy variable 
equal to one if the respondent overestimates or underestimates the replacement rate by more than 
25 percentage points.
9 In Table 6 we relate both indicators to a set of demographics and economic 
variables designed to control for the costs and the incentives to acquire and process information 
on retirement matters. We report separate regressions for males and females. 
In the first two regressions the age coefficient is negative, confirming Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2005) finding that workers closer to retirement are able to perform better pension 
calculations. Errors are lower for public employees, possibly because this is a highly unionized 
sector. Given the close link between earnings and replacement rates, income risk might be 
associated with higher expectation errors. Indeed, we find that the coefficients of “self-
employed” and “resident in the South”, two variables related to income risk, are negative.  
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) and Lusardi (2003) highlight the importance of acquiring 
information through relatives and friends, and indeed the presence of a retired person in the 
household is associated with lower expectation errors. Word of mouth is also likely to be more 
effective for those living in households with multiple earners, accounting for the negative 
association between multiple earners and misinformation. As in Mitchell (1988), we find that 
expectation errors are positively related with age of entry into the labor market: other things 
equal, less experienced workers form less accurate expectations. Finally, the regressions in Table 
6 confirm that expectation errors increase after the reform, which is consistent with the 
descriptive analysis and the intuition that the reform is associated with greater uncertainty. 
The probit for whether workers overestimate or underestimate the replacement rate by 
more than 25 percentage points delivers similar results. Large mistakes increase after the reform 
by 8 percent, and are negatively associated with respondent’s age. Furthermore, mistakes are 
lower for those living with a retired relative or in a multiple earner household.  
Overall, the descriptive and regression analysis suggests that, on average, expectation 
errors are in the range of 3 percent before and after the reform, and that pension information 
improves as people approach retirement or when they can learn from peers or from those who are 
already retired. The evidence also suggests that the precision of expectations falls after the 
reform, particularly for the groups affected by the reform. 
                                                 
9 As a robustness check we use squared expectation errors as the dependent variable. The results are unchanged.    12
3.3. Difference-in-difference estimates 
 
To gain further insights into the process of expectation formation, we exploit a unique 
feature of our data, which is that pension expectations are elicited before and after a period of 
intense reforms. This allows us to use a difference-in-difference framework to study how 
expected retirement age and expected replacement rate have been affected by the pension 
reforms. As with other studies that use a quasi-experimental framework, our tests rely on the 
assumptions that the pension reform is exogenous with respect to individual decisions – in 
particular, with respect to retirement age – and changes in sample composition.  
As far as the first assumption is concerned, we believe that the possible endogeneity of the 
reform can be safely ruled out. The reform was not implemented in order to offset different paths 
of retirement ages by different cohorts or employment groups. Rather, the 1992 reform was part 
of a major deficit-reduction package, prompted by a severe political crisis coupled with the 
dramatic devaluation of the lira; it was closely followed by the deepest recession of the post-war 
era. The 1995 and 1997 reforms were prompted by the huge projected deficits of the social 
security system and the attempt to meet the Maastricht criteria. 
The second assumption posits that shifts in sample composition are exogenous with respect 
to pension expectations. Cohorts and gender are obviously determined at birth. As far as 
employment groups are concerned, we require that mobility across various sectors (for instance, 
from public to private employment or self-employment) are independent of pension expectations, 
i.e. that workers did not switch jobs as a result of the pension reform itself. Since the SHIW has a 
rotating panel component, we can check the validity of this assumption by computing the 
transition rates across the three employment groups between each pair of adjacent survey years 
from 1989 to 2002; the Appendix – available on request - reports the transition rates for 1989-91 
and 2000-02. We find that, in each period, the probability of not changing sector is about 90 
percent for each of the three groups. Furthermore, we do not reject the hypothesis that the degree 
of sector mobility is the same before and after the reform for each of the estimated transition 
matrices.
10 Although we cannot test directly the hypothesis that workers did not change sector as 
a consequence of the reform, we take this as indirect evidence that the pension reform has not 
changed the overall pattern of workers’ mobility across sectors. 
We can identify the effect of the reform on expected retirement age and replacement rate 
because there is one group of individuals (old private employees) that was unaffected by the 
reform, while other groups (public employees, self-employed, the young and the middle-aged) 
were affected and should have revised their expectations downward. Therefore to disentangle the 
effect of the reforms on expectations from other effects, such as common trends in determinants 
of labor supply and business cycle effects, we compare the difference over time in the 
replacement rate of the middle-aged with the same difference for the old. Our approach does not 
require panel data. What we need to observe is a representative sample of the various groups in 
                                                 
10 As an example, consider the Shorrocks mobility index in 1989-91 (12.5 percent) and 2000-02 (13 percent). The 
statistical test does not reject the hypothesis that mobility is the same in the two periods (the associated statistic is 
0.12 and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to one). The same test can be performed for each 
of the transition matrices (1991-93, 1993-95, 1995-98, 1998-2000), and in all cases we do not reject the hypothesis 
that mobility is constant.   13
each of the two periods and therefore rely on repeated cross-sectional data. The young cannot be 
used to evaluate the effect of the reform because they entered the labor market after 1995. Since 
they were sampled only after the reform was in place, they are dropped from the analysis. 
We pool all data from pre- and post-reform periods and specify a reduced form for the 
expected retirement age and replacement rate; we denote by y the relevant variable of interest. 
We assume that before the reform y  is a linear function of socio-demographic variables X, 
employment status (private, public, self-employed) and depends on whether the years of 
contributions as of 1995 are more or less than 18: 
 
i i i i i i i i i i SELF M PUB M M SELF PUB X y ε δ δ δ α α α β + + + + + + + = * * 3 2 1 3 2 1    (1) 
 
The reference group in the regression equation is the group of old, private employees; the dummy 
variable M equals 1 for the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995). The α 
coefficients capture the different rules applying to public employees (PUB) and self-employed 
(SELF) relative to private employees, whereas theδ coefficients measure the potential differences 
between middle-aged and old of the three employment groups. 
After the reform y potentially shifts for all groups, so we augment the previous equation 
with terms that interact the cohort (M), the post-reform period (POST, where POST equals one 
for the post-reform period) and the employment status (SELF, PUB): 
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The φ coefficients capture the change in y after the reform for the three employment groups:  1 φ  
measures the change for old private employees and  2 φ  and  3 φ  the additional effects for public 
employees and self-employed. The γ coefficients measure the change in y for the middle aged due 
to the reform, and are our main parameters of interest. We expect the reform to increase 
retirement age and to reduce the replacement rate, and that this effect should be largest for public 
employees and for the self-employed, as shown in Section 2. The model is estimated separately 
for males and females, omitting the transitional 1993-1997 period. 
Table 7 reports the results for expected retirement age. In the first specification we drop the 
control vector X, and regress expected retirement age on a set of group dummies. The results 
indicate that after the reform expected retirement age increases for all middle-aged workers, and 
particularly for public employees (1.449) and self-employed (1.475).  
The second regression adds to the basic specification regional and educational dummies 
and annual earnings (in thousand Euro). We find that expected retirement age is considerably 
higher in the South (the coefficient is 1.682) and for workers with a college degree (2.971 
years).
11 On the other hand, each thousand euro of income reduces expected retirement age by 
0.015 years. The two regressions for females in Table 7 confirm most of the patterns found for 
                                                 
11 The positive effect of the dummy for the South is likely to arise from the fact that workers in the South enter the 
labor market later than in other parts of the country, and therefore qualify later for a pension.   14
males, though the effects for middle-aged females are somewhat larger, particularly for self-
employed, who raise their retirement age by around 2 years.  
Table 8 focuses on the expected replacement rate. We find a 4 percentage point reduction 
in the replacement rate for middle-aged private employees and self-employed after the reform, 
and a 2 percentage point reduction for middle-aged public employees. If we use the statutory 
replacement rates in Table 5 as benchmark, the percentage point reduction in replacement rates 
after the reform, for the middle-aged in relation to the old, should be of 4.7 for private employees, 
8.5 for public employees and 18.9 for the self-employed, suggesting that only private employees 
change their expected replacement rates as required by the reform. The second regression adds to 
the basic specification regional and educational dummies and annual earnings (in thousand Euro). 
Working in the South and the level of income are positively related to the replacement rate. The 
effect of the education dummies is positive, although university degree is not statistically 
different from zero for males. 
The regressions for females uncover an across-the-board reduction in the replacement rate 
after the reform, but the employment dummies interacted with the M and POST dummies signal 
no differential effect by employment groups or cohort after the reform. The corresponding 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero, while Table 5 implies a large reduction in the 
replacement rate for each employment group. 
In summary, the regressions suggest that most groups have revised their expectations in the 
direction implied by the reform. But the revision to the new pension rules has been far from 
complete. Two interpretations of the results are possible: an anticipation effect, or lack of 
information. If the reform had been anticipated, people would have adjusted downward the 
expected replacement rate (and upward the retirement age) even before the reform. This 
explanation clashes with the fact that, on average, the 1989-91 expected replacement rates were 
quite close to – or even overestimated – the statutory rates. Furthermore, the distribution of 
expectation errors before the reform (top panel of Figure 2) shows that in all employment groups 
a substantial fraction of workers make non-negligible errors; this is particularly true for public 
employees, whose distribution is centered around zero, and for whom, therefore, looking at the 
whole distribution rather than at the mean is particularly important. Finally, the anticipation effect 
should be stronger in the years immediately before the reform; however, dropping 1991 and 
defining the pre-reform period as just 1989 does not change the results with respect to estimates 
in Table 8. Therefore, the most likely explanation for our findings is that, as of 2002, many 
workers did not fully understand the implications of the new pension regime and had not yet 
updated their pension expectations accordingly. 
 
4. The offset between pension wealth and private wealth accumulation 
 
The analysis presented in the previous section suggests that people reacted to the pension 
reform by raising expectations of retirement age and reducing perceived replacement rates (and 
therefore expected pension wealth). However, the magnitude of the expectation revision is 
considerably lower than the actual magnitudes implied by the reform. This is an important first 
step in evaluating the effect of pension reforms on individual behavior. The next step relates 
perceived pension wealth to private accumulation, accounting for the different degree of workers’   15
information. We use the expectation error in social security wealth as an index of the workers’ 
knowledge of their pension entitlements and to identify two groups in the sample, which we will 
call “informed” and “uninformed” workers.  Accordingly, in this section we estimate the offset 
for the whole sample and also for the informed and uniformed workers samples. 
Our empirical specification relates private wealth relative to income to pension wealth 
(relative to income) and to a set of observable variables potentially correlated with private wealth. 
This is different from Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) who model the response of the change in 
private wealth relative to income (the saving rate) to the level of pension wealth relative to 
income. This amounts to assuming that saving changes permanently when social security wealth 
changes. Our specification implicitly posits that the saving effect is temporary, aiming to estimate 
the change in the stock of private wealth after the change in expected pension wealth induced by 
the reforms. More specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 
it it it t it WY SSWY X α δγ θ ε =+ + ++   (3) 
 
where WYit is private wealth of household i at time t, scaled by household disposable income, 
SSWYit is the ratio of expected pension wealth retirement (evaluated at time t) to earnings,  Xit is a 
vector that includes age of the household head,
12 disposable income, year dummies, education 
dummies, and region dummies;
13  θ t represents time effects. Age, income, and education are 
proxies for lifetime earnings, while year dummies capture macroeconomic effects. Private wealth 
is defined as financial assets plus real assets (real estates and businesses) minus financial debt. 
  
4.1. The construction of pension wealth 
  
We calculate the ratio of expected pension wealth (at retirement) to earnings (evaluated at 
time t) in a way that keeps the computation as simple as possible while being tailored to the 
inclusion of elicited expectations of the replacement rate and the retirement age. To do this, we 
use the following proxy for each worker’s pension wealth-to-income ratio: 
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where σt is the expected replacement rate and Nt the expected retirement age elicited at time t,
14 T 
the maximum length of life, p(τ|N) the probability of surviving to age τ, conditional on being 
alive at age N, gu the growth rate of earnings for group u, r the real interest rate, and gN the 
growth rate of pension benefits during retirement – assumed to be the same for all groups. 
In the survey we observe σt and Nt for each individual. In the empirical estimates we will 
check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumption of point expectations for Nt, 
                                                 
12 We define the head of the household as the partner with higher earnings. 
13 In the regressions, the reference group is private employees with less than 13 years of education and living in 
Northern Italy. 
14 t  is equal to 1989, 1991, 2000, 2002, the survey years in which the expected replacement rate is elicited.   16
allowing for some dispersion around the reported expected retirement age. Survival probabilities 
are taken from the Italian life tables, by age and gender, for the years 1990 and 2000, so that the 
change in life expectancy over time, and in particular before and after the reform, is accounted 
for.
15 The growth rate of earnings (gu) is estimated from our data at 0.015 for individuals with 
university degree and at 0.008 for individuals with less than university degree.
16 We assume that 
after retirement pensions are constant in real terms (gN=0) and that the real interest rate is equal to 
2 percent. 
Armed with this information, we can compute the expected ratio of pension wealth-to-
income for each individual in the sample. In households with more than one member, we define 
the household expected pension wealth-to-income ratio at retirement as the weighted sum of both 
partners’ expected pension wealth-to-income ratio.
17  
The individual expected pension wealth-to-income ratio is adjusted by the factor suggested 
by Gale (1998). This factor rescales the expected pension wealth and depends on the number of 
years people have contributed to their pension plan as well as for when in their life cycle they 
have experienced some shock that should have made them revise their consumption and savings 
plans (the reforms, in our case). Omitting to adjust for this factor would produce an 
underestimate of the offset between pension wealth and private wealth, i.e. the estimates for the 
pension wealth coefficient would be biased towards zero. The adjustment depends on the utility 
function that is chosen for the underlying life-cycle model and on the values for the discount rate, 
the interest rate and the time preference rate. We use the adjustment developed in Gale (1998) for 
the constant relative risk aversion utility function and set the discount rate and the interest rate 
equal to 2 percent; details are reported in an Appendix that is available on request. 
 
4.2. Regression estimates 
 
Table 9 presents OLS estimates of the relation between pension wealth and private wealth.  
OLS estimates are inefficient if the disturbance term is heteroskedastic. Standard errors are 
therefore corrected using the White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
estimator. The specification relates the private wealth-income ratio to pension wealth, time 
dummies, age, employment dummies, a dummy for middle-aged, employment dummies 
interacted with the middle-aged dummies and with time dummies, education and regional 
dummies and income. 
The key coefficient of interest is the offset between private and pension wealth, which is -
0.286 and statistically different from zero at the one percent level (the standard error is 0.027). 
The estimates also indicate that the wealth-income ratio increases with age during the working 
lifetime (recall that individuals over 50 are excluded) and with income. The latter should not 
affect the wealth-income ratio if preferences are homothetic. The regression coefficient, on the 
other hand, can hardly be interpreted as evidence for or against homothetic preferences since 
other variables (employment, education or residence in the South) also proxy for lifetime 
                                                 
15 Data source: Italian Statistical Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1990 and 2000). 
16 The growth rates were obtained from a median regression of log-earnings on sex and employment dummies and 
full interaction of age with a college dummy. Data source: SHIW, years 1989-2002, individuals with age 20-60. 
17 Weights are given by the ratio of each partner's income to the joint income of the couple.   17
earnings. Residence in the South reduces wealth accumulation; education has an opposite effect. 
These variables are related to household resources, but may also capture other effects. For 
instance, there is evidence that the better educated are more likely to report financial assets 
(Brandolini and Cannari, 1994); households with higher education may have easier access to 
capital markets and to better investment opportunities; thrift may be correlated with schooling. 
Finally, the wealth-income ratio for public employees is not statistically different from that of 
private employees but the self-employed have a higher wealth-income ratio. 
We then split the sample according to the difference between the statutory and expected 
pension wealth-income ratio. In particular, we consider as “Informed” households where the 
difference is less than one, in absolute value; the rest of the sample is “Uninformed.”
18 The 
estimated offset for the informed is larger in absolute value (-0.379) than that for the uninformed 
(-0.237); both coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level.
19 
The OLS results might understate the offset between pension wealth and private wealth if 
pension wealth and private wealth are positively correlated. This might be the case if thrift and 
hard work are correlated tastes, and people with these traits choose to save more and to retire 
with higher pension wealth. Since the pension reforms provide us with an exogenous source of 
variation for pension wealth, we can perform instrumental variable estimation and remove this 
source of bias from our estimates. 
We use as instruments the interaction between the three employment dummies, a dummy 
for the post-reform period and a dummy for middle-aged. The validity of these instruments rests 
on the fact that the rules for computing pension wealth change exogenously for the middle-aged 
after the reform, depending on employment group membership. It also depends on the 
assumption that the middle-aged did not switch jobs after the reform to offset the impact of the 
pension reform on their retirement wealth. Under this reasonable assumption, which is 
corroborated by the evidence on employment transition matrices reported in an Appendix that is 
available on request, the instruments are also exogenous with respect to private wealth 
accumulation decisions. Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) use similar employment-group 
instruments for pension wealth in their study of the impact of the 1992 Italian pension reform on 
the household saving rate. 
To assess the quality of our instruments we perform the test of the over-identifying 
restrictions and the rank test. The Hansen-Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying 
restrictions: the test is equal to 0.503 and is distributed as a Chi-Square with 2 degrees of freedom 
(the p-value is 0.77). We check the rank condition regressing pension wealth on the full set of 
instruments and testing the null that the coefficients of the instruments are jointly equal to zero. 
The F-test rejects this null at 1 percent level and implies that the rank condition is satisfied. The 
results from the instrumental variables estimation are reported in the last three columns of Table 
9. They indicate higher offset rates between private wealth and pension wealth than in the OLS 
estimates. The sample splits deliver again considerably higher offset rates for the informed (-
0.81) than for the uninformed (-0.44). 
                                                 
18 The median of the absolute value of the difference between statutory and expected pension wealth is 1. 
19 In a specification including only pension wealth, age and year dummies, the offset between private wealth and 
pension wealth is -0.419 (standard error of 0.025). In the sample of informed workers, the offset is -0.547 (standard 
error of 0.043); in the sample of uninformed it is -0.347 (standard error of 0.033).   18
To check the sensitivity of the results to some of the assumptions used to compute social 
security wealth, we allow for some dispersion around the point estimate of the expected 
retirement age in equation (4). We perturb retirement age by adding a draw from a discrete 
uniform distribution with zero mean and variance equal to 2. In the IV regressions, the offset 
rates are -0.659 (standard error 0.312) in the total sample, and -0.946 and -0.383 in the sample of 
informed and uninformed workers, respectively. As a further check, we double the variance and 
the results don’t change appreciably.
20 
We perform several other sensitivity tests. The results are not affected if one uses the least 
absolute deviations estimator or if one includes other variables, such as family size, number of 
income recipients, and a quadratic term in age. We also check the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to the particular assumptions used to calculate the Gale adjustment factor (the interest 
rate, the discount factor and the coefficient of relative risk-aversion) described in the Appendix 
and find that adopting an interest rate and a discount rate greater than 2 percent implies slightly 
lower offsets. 
 
 
4.3. Comparison with previous studies and implications 
 
Using SHIW data for the years 1989-95, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) exploit the 
changes in pension wealth across cohorts and employment groups due to the 1992 pension reform 
in order to estimate the crowding out effect of pension wealth. They model the response of the 
change in private wealth relative to income (the household saving rate) to the level of social 
security wealth relative to income. This amounts to assuming that saving changes permanently 
when social security wealth changes. In the long run, this implies a very large effect of a pension 
reform on private wealth and the capital stock. 
Attanasio and Brugiavini conduct a miniature policy experiment to show that if a pension 
reform reduces social security wealth of a “typical” individual by 10 percent of its initial value 
(about 3 years of income according to Attanasio-Brugiavini Table II, p. 1096), the first year after 
the reform the private saving rate of this individual increases by 4.4 percentage points (from 4.2 
to 8.6 percent). Since according to their estimates different age-groups and different individuals 
respond differently to the pension reform, this result cannot be generalized to the entire sample or 
to the population at large. In the long run, given their specification, the estimated offset 
coefficients between social security wealth and private wealth do not provide a round number for 
the effects of the 1992 pension reform on the change in aggregate saving, wealth and the capital 
stock.
21 
                                                 
20 The OLS offset coefficients are also similar to those reported in Table 9: -0.228 for the total sample, -0.359 for the 
informed, and -0.269 for the uninformed. 
21 For Italy, three earlier studies sought to evaluate the degree of substitution between social security and private 
wealth. Brugiavini (1987), using data from the 1984 SHIW, finds a rather small substitution (around 10 percent) 
between social security and private wealth accumulation.  Jappelli (1995) finds an offset coefficient around 20 
percent in the 1989-91 SHIW. Rossi and Visco (1994), using aggregate time series, estimate that social security 
wealth offsets private wealth by 21 percent (32 percent using an instrumental variables procedure), concluding that 
the development of a generous social security system explains about one fourth of the 7.2 percentage-point decline in 
the Italian private saving rate between 1962-72 and 1980-90.   19
In this paper we relate the level of private wealth (relative to income) to the level of social 
security wealth (relative to income). The results can be used to estimate the change in the stock of 
private wealth when households have fully adjusted to the new pension regime after the three 
reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997). We rely on a measure of pension wealth based on the expected 
retirement age and expected replacement rate, rather than computed from legislation, and 
estimate the offset between pension wealth and discretionary wealth according to the accuracy of 
workers’ information about pension arrangements. The regressions show that workers whose 
expectations are closer to the statutory levels (“Informed”) have larger offsets.
22 To the extent 
that in the long-run expectations adjust fully to the new pension regime, the estimates for the 
informed measure the long-run impact of the reform on discretionary wealth. 
To provide a sense of the magnitudes involved, we compute the pension wealth for a male 
belonging to the so-called middle-aged group, with 13 years of education (i.e. a non-university 
graduate), who expects to retire at age 62. Table 10 reports pension wealth for such an individual 
conditional on being a private or a public employee, or self-employed, and in both pre- and post-
reform regimes. After the reform pension wealth falls for each employment group, and the 
reduction is larger for public employees and the self-employed. According to our estimates, the 
reduction in pension wealth prompts an increase in private wealth.
23 If we use the IV estimated 
offsets in Table 9,
24 then under the assumption that informed workers perceive the entire 
reduction in pension wealth, the private wealth-to income ratio increases by 0.9 for private 
employees, 2.5 for public employees and 2.8 for self-employed.
25 
The drawback of our static specification, of course, is that we cannot estimate how saving 
changes during the adjustment process that follows the pension reform. But our data indicate that 
private wealth adjusts slowly, since many workers don’t perceive the full change in social 
security wealth. Furthermore, our estimated coefficient for the uninformed means that for a large 
portion of the working population there is far from full crowding out of private accumulation 
several years after the pension reform. This makes the question of whether the uninformed are 
saving enough for their retirement of central interest. 
 
                                                 
22 If we estimated the offset between pension wealth and discretionary wealth using the statutory pension wealth-
income ratio (in a similar fashion to previous studies), the OLS coefficient would be –0.38 (significant at 1 percent 
level), which is close to what we find for the informed group but much higher than the offset that we estimate for the 
uninformed (-0.24). 
23 If uninformed workers perceive only 70 percent of the reduction in pension wealth, the private wealth-income ratio 
increases by only 0.3 for private employees, 1.0 for public employees, and 1.1 for self-employed. 
24 These coefficients are -0.810 for the informed and -0.441 for the uninformed. 
25 Comparing the change in the statutory to the expected pension wealth-income ratio reveals that, among the 
middle-aged, the informed have perceived almost fully the reduction in the pension wealth-income ratio, and the 
uninformed have perceived only about 70 percent of the reduction in the statutory ratio. On average, for the informed 
the difference between the statutory pension wealth-income ratio before and after the reform is -1.28; the difference 
in the expected counterparts is -1.27. For the uninformed the corresponding differences are -3.64 and -2.54.   20
5. Conclusions 
 
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large representative sample of the Italian 
population, elicits expectations of replacement rates from workers interviewed in the years 
between 1989 and 2002, a period of intense pension reforms. The reforms reduced replacement 
rates and increased retirement ages, and had different impacts on different cohorts and 
employment groups. This exogenous variation in replacement rates allows us to study the effect 
of pension reforms on expectations, and how changes in expected social security wealth were 
reflected in private wealth accumulation decisions. 
We find that pension reforms indeed affected expectations of retirement benefits. However, 
the revision in expectations is limited, and many individuals have still not completely updated 
their expectations. For instance, while the perceived replacement rate of the self-employed falls 
by about 10 percentage points between 1989-91 and 2000-02, in reality the rate falls by about 20 
points. Moreover, the offset between pension wealth and expected private wealth is only partial, 
in the order of 30 percent in the total sample (60 percent in the IV estimation). Most importantly, 
the offset coefficient is higher for people that are more informed about their future benefits. Once 
expectations adjust fully to the new rules, the offset between private wealth and pension wealth is 
likely to be higher. This suggests that the effect of pension reform depends critically on the extent 
of the knowledge and information that individuals have about the social security system and 
changes to it, and has three important policy implications. 
First, the descriptive and econometric analysis implies that some workers lack information 
to fully understand pension rules, thus making a case for investing public resources in the 
dissemination of information about pension rights, especially during periods of intense reform. 
Campaigns to increase financial literacy and the understanding of pension rules, and to provide 
individuals with regular statements of their expected retirement income, are important steps in 
this direction.
26 Second, the paper suggests that if one wants to use observations of past pension 
reforms to make predictions about likely responses to new reforms, then one needs to estimate 
how responses in the past were limited by inaccurate updating of expectations, and how the new 
reform will affect expectations. Finally, given the dramatic reduction in replacement rates 
implied by the pension reform, combined with an incomplete offset between pension wealth and 
private wealth, it is likely that some individuals, especially the younger cohorts most affected by 
the reform, might not be saving enough for their old age. This might have a long-term impact on 
the well being of future retirees in the coming decades, when the generations affected by the 
pension reform will start to retire. 
 
                                                 
26 Indeed, the 1995 reform requires the social security agency to inform workers about pension rights, as in Sweden. 
In practice, this part of the reform has not been implemented. See also Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) for 
an analysis of workers’ perceptions about social security in Europe.   21
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Figure 1 
Expectation error distribution before and after the pension reforms 
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Note. The figure plots the expectation error in the pre-reform (1989-91) and post-reform (2000-02) regimes. The 
expectation error is defined as the difference between the expected replacement rate and the statutory replacement 
rate. 
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Figure 2 
Expectation error distribution before and after the pension reforms, by employment groups 
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Note. The figure plots the expectation error in the pre-reform (1989-91) and post-reform (2000-02) regimes for three 
employment groups. The expectation error is defined as the difference between the expected replacement rate and the 
statutory replacement rate. 
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Table 1 
Retirement age and pension award formula before and after the pension reforms 
 
Retirement age 
 
Old age pensions  Seniority pensions 
Minimum retirement age  Minimum years of contributions 
 
Private sector  Public 
sector 
Self-
employed 
Minimum 
years of 
contributions
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Self-
employed 
Pre-1992 
regime 
All 
workers 
60(55) 65(60)  65(60)  15  35  20  35 
 
Old 
Progressively 
rising to 
65(60) 
65(60) 65(60)  Progressively 
rising to 20 
40 before age 57 
35 after age 57 
40 before 
age 58; 
35 after 
age 58 
 
Middle-
aged 
Progressively 
rising to 
65(60) 
65(60) 65(60)  Progressively 
rising to 20 
40 before age 57 
35 after age 57 
40 before 
age 58; 
35 after 
age 58 
 
 
 
Post-1997 
regime 
Young  Subject to incentives: 57-65 
 
5 Abolished 
 
 
Pension award formula 
 
 
 
Private sector  Public sector  Self-employed 
 
 
Pre-1992 
regime 
 
All workers 
Earnings model 
2%  × years of 
contributions  × average 
of the last 5 years of 
earnings 
 
2.33%  × years of 
contribution × last year of 
earnings 
2%  × years of 
contributions  × 
times average of the 
last 10 years of 
earnings 
 
Old 
Earnings model 
Gradually to 2% × years 
of contribution × 
average of last 10 years 
of earnings 
Gradually to 2% × years of 
contribution  × average of 
last 10 years of earnings 
Gradually to 2% × 
years of contribution 
× average of last 15 
years of earnings 
 
Middle-aged 
Pro rata model 
 
 
Earnings model before 1995, contribution model after 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-1997 
regime 
 
Young 
Contribution model 
Contributions (33% of gross wage for employees and 20% for self-
employed) are capitalized on the basis of 5-years moving average of GDP 
growth. The capitalized sum is then multiplied by a coefficient that varies by 
retirement age, taking into account life expectancy. 
 
 
Note. Old, middle-aged and young refer, respectively, to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 1995, 
less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, and who start working after 1995. In the top panel female retirement age 
is reported in parenthesis when different from males. 
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Table 2 
The replacement rate before and after the pension reforms 
 
Retirement age: 60 
 Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
Private employees     
Old 67.3  66.3  -1 
Middle-aged 67.3  58.2  -9.1 
Young 67.3  54.9  -12.4 
Public employees     
Old 81.6  76.5  -5.1 
Middle-aged 81.6  61.0  -20.6 
Young 81.6  54.9  -26.7 
Self-employed     
Old   64.1  63.3  -0.8 
Middle-aged 64.1  41.7  -22.4 
Young 64.1  33.3  -30.8 
Retirement age: 62 
 Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
Private employees     
Old 71.2  70.1  -1.0 
Middle-aged 71.2  64.0  -7.1 
Young 71.2  61.7  -9.4 
Public employees     
Old 86.2  81.2  -5.0 
Middle-aged 86.2  66.9  -19.3 
Young 86.2  61.7  -24.5 
Self-employed     
Old   67.8  66.9  -0.9 
Middle-aged 67.8  45.2  -22.6 
Young 67.8  37.4  -30.4 
 
Note. The replacement rate is computed on the basis of legislation and a given retirement age. In the post-reform 
regime, for the “middle-aged” and the “young” the replacement rate is calculated on the assumptions that the growth 
rate of earnings and aggregate GDP are 2 percent and 1.5 percent per year, respectively. In the top panel the 
retirement age is 60, and each worker contributes for 35 years before retiring; in the post-reform regime, the “old” 
contributes 25 years before 1995 and 10 years after, and the “middle-aged” 10 years before 1995 and 25 years after. 
In the lower panel, the retirement age is 62, and each worker contributes for 37 years before retiring; in the post-
reform regime, the “old” contributes 27 years before 1995 and 10 years after, and the “middle-aged” 10 years before 
1995 and 27 years after. 
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Table 3 
Expected retirement age: descriptive statistics 
 Males  Females 
  Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
Private employees        
Old  58.8  60.7 1.9 55.7  58.8 3.0 
Middle-aged  59.8  62.3 2.6 56.4  60.1 3.7 
Young   63.1    61.1  
Public employees        
Old  59.4  60.6 1.2 56.9  59.8 3.0 
Middle-aged  59.5  62.2 2.7 56.7  60.8 4.1 
Young   63.9    61.4  
Self-employed        
Old    62.1  63.1 1.0 59.0  60.4 1.4 
Middle-aged  61.6  64.1 2.5 58.0  61.7 3.7 
Young   64.3    61.8  
Note. Data are drawn from the 1989-2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989-1991, the post-reform period is 
2000-2002. The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” less than 18 years of 
contributions in 1995, the “young” entered the labor market after 1995. 
 
 
Table 4 
Expected replacement rate: descriptive statistics 
 
 Males  Females 
  Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
Private employees        
Old 79.2  74.9  -4.3 77.2 71.1 -6.1 
Middle-aged 79.2  70.8  -8.4 76.9 70.0 -6.9 
Young   67.9    67.2  
Public employees        
Old 81.8  79.9  -1.9 78.3 74.0 -4.3 
Middle-aged 80.6  76.6  -4.0 78.3 72.8 -5.5 
Young   73.9    69.1  
Self-employed        
Old   69.0  61.2  -7.8 65.3 57.3 -8.0 
Middle-aged  71.1 59.0 -12.1 69.7 58.9 -10.8 
Young   61.8    57.4  
Note. Data are drawn from the 1989-2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989-1991, the post-reform period is 
2000-2002. The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” less than 18 years of 
contributions in 1995, the “young” entered the labor market after 1995. 
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Table 5 
Statutory replacement rate: descriptive statistics 
 
 Males  Females 
  Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
Private employees        
Old  71.2  71.5 0.3 67.3  71.5 4.2 
Middle-aged 71.2  66.8  -4.4 67.3 62.1 -5.2 
Young   67     61.2   
Public employees        
Old 86.2  80  -6.2  79.2  79.5  0.3 
Middle-aged  83.9 69.2 -14.7 76.9 65.4 -11.5 
Young   66.2    55.3  
Self-employed        
Old   71.5  69.9  -1.5  67.8  69.9  2.1 
Middle-aged  69.6 49.2 -20.4 62.3 45.2 -17.1 
Young   41.1    35.5  
Note. The statutory replacement rate is computed on the basis of the relevant pension legislation and of average 
expected retirement age for each cell in data drawn from the 1989-2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989-1991, 
the post-reform period is 2000-2002. The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” 
less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “young” entered the labor market after 1995. 
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Table 6 
Regressions for the expectation error in the replacement rate 
 
  Absolute expectation error  Probability of errors greater than  
25 percentage points: 
 marginal effects 
 
 Males  Females  Males  Females 
 
Age -0.083  -0.111  -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.017)**  (0.024)**  (0.000)**  (0.001)** 
Public employee  -0.645  -1.137  -0.004  -0.012 
 (0.302)*  (0.384)**  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Self-employed 3.794  3.170  0.084  0.086 
 (0.313)**  (0.512)**  (0.010)**  (0.017)** 
Retired household member  -3.010  -3.213  -0.091  -0.072 
 (0.865)**  (1.118)**  (0.026)**  (0.034)* 
Multiple earners  -0.642  -0.805  -0.018  -0.018 
 (0.274)*  (0.524)  (0.008)*  (0.016) 
Age at the first job  0.239  0.575  0.008  0.015 
 (0.058)**  (0.055)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Central Italy  0.584  0.824  0.014  0.017 
 (0.325)  (0.423)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Southern Italy  1.156  0.954  0.034  0.023 
 (0.290)**  (0.422)*  (0.009)**  (0.013) 
Income 0.012  -0.015  0.000  -0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.028)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
High-school degree  -0.207  -0.787  -0.011  -0.028 
  (0.273)  (0.389)* (0.008) (0.012)* 
College degree  0.553  -0.844  0.007  -0.009 
 (0.510)  (0.584)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
Post-reform 2.523  2.429  0.085  0.084 
 (0.252)**  (0.358)**  (0.007)**  (0.010)** 
Constant 9.696  6.350     
 (1.320)**  (1.462)**     
        
Observations 9186  5519  9186  5519 
 
Note. The expectation error is the difference between the expected and the statutory replacement rate. The latter is 
computed on the basis of the relevant pension legislation and the individual’s expected retirement age. The first two 
columns report OLS estimates of the absolute value of the expectation error. The third and fourth columns report 
marginal effects of a probit where the dependent variable equals one if the expectation error is larger than 25 
percentage points.  Data are drawn from 1989-91 (pre-reform) and 2000-02 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Two stars indicate statistically significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% 
level.    30
 
Table 7 
The effect of the pension reform on the expected retirement age: regression results 
 
 Males  Females 
Private employee, middle-aged, after the reform  0.686  0.575  0.704  0.689 
 (0.277)*  (0.269)*  (0.412)  (0.405) 
Public employee, middle-aged, after the reform  1.449  1.091  1.110  0.875 
  (0.392)** (0.381)** (0.387)**  (0.380)* 
Self-employed, middle-aged, after the reform  1.475  1.572  2.285  2.353 
  (0.437)** (0.424)** (0.690)** (0.678)** 
Public employee  0.605  -0.003  1.112  0.302 
  (0.202)** (0.197) (0.278)** (0.280) 
Self-employed  3.257 3.152 3.283 3.180 
  (0.243)** (0.237)** (0.410)** (0.403)** 
Middle-aged  0.953 0.868 0.670 0.513 
 (0.198)**  (0.193)**  (0.297)*  (0.293) 
Public  employee,  middle-aged  -0.818 -0.925 -0.849 -0.663 
  (0.333)* (0.323)** (0.402)*  (0.395) 
Self-employed,  middle-aged  -1.459 -1.873 -1.650 -1.922 
  (0.388)** (0.377)** (0.603)** (0.593)** 
Post-reform  1.887 2.084 3.017 3.073 
  (0.207)** (0.201)** (0.328)** (0.322)** 
Public employee, after the reform  -0.659 -0.524 -0.029 0.235 
  (0.354) (0.343) (0.443) (0.435) 
Self-employed,  after  the  reform  -0.857 -0.882 -1.621 -1.628 
 (0.381)*  (0.370)*  (0.612)**  (0.602)** 
Central  Italy   0.513  0.653 
   (0.121)**  (0.151)** 
Southern  Italy   1.682  1.536 
   (0.104)**  (0.149)** 
Earnings   -0.015  -0.006 
   (0.005)**   (0.010) 
High  school  degree   1.177  0.540 
   (0.100)**  (0.139)** 
University  school  degree   2.971  1.976 
   (0.163)**  (0.201)** 
Constant  58.804 57.801 55.740 55.128 
  (0.123)** (0.157)** (0.213)** (0.252)** 
      
Observations  9724 9724 5925 5925 
R-squared  0.12 0.17 0.15 0.18 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the expected retirement age. The regressions are estimated by OLS. Data are drawn 
from 1989-91 (pre-reform) and 2000-02 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two stars 
indicate statistically significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level. 
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Table 8 
The effect of the reform on the expected replacement rate: regression results 
 
 Males  Females 
 
Private employee, middle-aged, after the reform  -4.143 -4.299 -0.825 -0.904 
 (0.962)**  (0.960)**  (1.430)  (1.421) 
Public employee, middle-aged, after the reform  -2.032  -2.350  -1.211  -1.412 
  (1.361) (1.360) (1.341) (1.335) 
Self-employed, middle-aged, after the reform  -4.283  -4.536  -2.805  -2.830 
 (1.516)**  (1.513)**  (2.393)  (2.379) 
Public  employee  2.650 2.389 1.070 -0.372 
 (0.699)**  (0.704)**  (0.963)  (0.981) 
Self-employed  -10.170 -10.488 -11.878 -12.040 
  (0.844)** (0.844)** (1.421)** (1.416)** 
Middle-aged 0.051  0.353  -0.314  -0.463 
  (0.686) (0.688) (1.030) (1.029) 
Public employee, middle-aged  -1.313  -1.418  0.337  0.603 
  (1.155) (1.152) (1.393) (1.385) 
Self-employed,  middle-aged  2.057 1.847 4.657 4.076 
 (1.348)  (1.346)  (2.093)*  (2.081) 
Post-reform  -4.298 -4.139 -6.088 -5.927 
  (0.717)** (0.717)** (1.137)** (1.130)** 
Public employee, after the reform  2.365  2.461  1.805  2.244 
 (1.228)  (1.225)*  (1.535)  (1.527) 
Self-employed,  after  the  reform  -3.508 -3.409 -1.895 -1.876 
 (1.320)**  (1.319)**  (2.124)  (2.113) 
Central  Italy   0.548  0.283 
   (0.433)  (0.531) 
Southern  Italy   1.114  2.445 
   (0.371)**  (0.522)** 
Earnings   0.099  0.185 
   (0.017)**  (0.033)** 
High  school  degree   0.950  2.024 
   (0.355)**  (0.487)** 
University  school  degree   0.142  1.727 
   (0.583)    (0.706)* 
Constant  79.191 76.604 77.192 73.468 
  (0.427)** (0.562)** (0.739)** (0.884)** 
      
Observations  9724 9724 5925 5925 
R-squared  0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the expected replacement rate. The regressions are estimated by OLS. Data are 
drawn from 1989-91 (pre-reform) and 2000-02 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Two stars indicate statistically significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level. 
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 Table 9 
The offset between private wealth and pension wealth: OLS and IV estimates 
 
 OLS  IV 
 Total 
sample 
Informed Uninformed  Total 
sample 
Informed Uninformed
 
SSW/Disposable Income  -0.286  -0.379 -0.237  -0.645 -0.810 -0.441 
 (0.027)**  (0.047)**  (0.036)** (0.303)*  (0.321)* (0.426) 
Year  1991  0.732  0.794 0.663  0.736 0.831 0.657 
 (0.098)**  (0.140)**  (0.137)**  (0.100)** (0.144)** (0.138)** 
Year  2000  0.935  1.049 0.881  0.613 0.858 0.642 
 (0.134)**  (0.190)**  (0.190)** (0.309)*  (0.247)**  (0.537) 
Year  2002  0.994  0.924 1.104  0.686 0.747 0.879 
 (0.140)**  (0.200)**  (0.199)** (0.300)*  (0.247)**  (0.514) 
Age  0.083  0.085 0.084  0.109 0.113 0.100 
 (0.009)**  (0.013)**  (0.012)**  (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.036)** 
Public employee  0.078  0.121  0.038  0.057  0.235  -0.004 
  (0.113)  (0.156) (0.169)  (0.119) (0.182) (0.196) 
Self-employed  1.775  1.866 1.639  1.337 1.566 1.298 
 (0.194)**  (0.275)**  (0.272)** (0.421)**  (0.352)** (0.776) 
Middle-aged -0.544  -0.688  -0.489 -1.226  -1.385  -0.961 
 (0.149)**  (0.221)**  (0.206)* (0.580)*  (0.542)*  (0.986) 
Public employee, middle-aged  0.095  0.101  0.158  0.146  0.056  0.249 
  (0.168)  (0.234) (0.247)  (0.180) (0.238) (0.331) 
Self-employed,  middle-aged  -0.239  0.095 -0.443  0.076  0.345 -0.184 
  (0.271)  (0.376) (0.399)  (0.409) (0.448) (0.700) 
Public employee, after the reform  0.194  0.283  0.053  0.205  0.222  0.036 
  (0.165)  (0.225) (0.243)  (0.167) (0.235) (0.250) 
Self-employed, after the reform  0.891  0.880  0.943  0.952  0.827  0.982 
 (0.262)**  (0.369)*  (0.380)*  (0.261)** (0.375)* (0.384)* 
Central  Italy  0.251  0.269 0.228  0.161 0.166 0.190 
  (0.103)*  (0.142) (0.150)  (0.127) (0.158) (0.169) 
Southern  Italy  -0.032  -0.028 -0.031  -0.125 -0.117 -0.088 
  (0.090)  (0.128) (0.128)  (0.120) (0.143) (0.174) 
Income  0.019  0.018 0.019  0.014 0.012 0.017 
 (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.006) (0.005)** 
High-school  degree  0.613  0.823 0.405  0.631 0.871 0.397 
 (0.087)**  (0.121)**  (0.125)**  (0.089)** (0.128)** (0.125)** 
College  degree  0.605  0.781 0.499  0.627 0.872 0.460 
 (0.131)**  (0.186)**  (0.184)**  (0.131)** (0.196)** (0.201)* 
Constant -0.378  -0.295  -0.427  0.268  0.203  0.012 
  (0.360)  (0.537) (0.484)  (0.635) (0.636) (1.017) 
Observations  9315  4687 4628  9315 4687 4628 
R-squared 0.14  0.16  0.13       
 
Note. The dependent variable is the wealth-income ratio. Informed and uninformed individuals are defined on the 
basis of the difference in expected and statutory pension wealth-income ratio (SSWY). We define as “Informed” 
someone who reports an absolute difference between SSWY constructed with the expected replacement rate and 
SSWY constructed with the statutory rate less than 1, and “Uninformed” those with a difference greater than 1, in 
absolute value. Data are drawn from 1989-91 (pre-reform) and 2000-02 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Two stars indicate statistically significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% 
level.   33
Table 10 
Change in the wealth-income ratio for informed and uninformed workers 
and employment groups 
 
  Pension wealth-income ratio  Changes in private  
wealth-income ratio  
 Pre-reform 
  
Post-reform Difference  Informed  Uninformed 
Private employees  11.0 9.9  -1.1  0.9  0.3 
Public employees  13.4 10.3  -3.1  2.5  1.0 
Self-employed  10.5 7.0  -3.5  2.9  1.1   
 
Note. In the pre-reform case, pension wealth is computed for a male worker, without college degree, who expects to 
retire at age 62 and to contribute 37 years (10 years before 1995 and 27 after). In the post-reform case, the 
replacement rate is based on the assumptions that the growth rates of earnings and GDP are 2% and 1.5% per year, 
respectively.  The change in the private wealth-income ratio for informed workers assumes that expected SSWY (the 
pension wealth-income ratio) equals statutory SSWY, i.e. that they perceive the full change in pension wealth, and 
that the offset coefficient is -0.810, as in the IV estimates of Table 9; the change in the private wealth-income ratio 
for uninformed workers assumes that this group only perceives 70 percent of the change in pension wealth and that 
the offset coefficient is -0.441, as in the IV estimates of Table 9. 
 
 CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2006/10  Renata Bottazzi 
Tullio Jappelli 
Mario Padula 
Retirement Expectations, Pension Reforms, and 
Their Impact on Private Wealth Accumulation 
2006/09  Markus Haas 
Stefan Mittnik 
Marc S. Paolella 
Multivariate Normal Mixture GARCH 
2006/08  Elena Carletti 
Philipp Hartmann 
Giancarlo Spagnolo 
Bank Mergers, Competition and Liquidity 
2006/07  Alexander Muermann 
Stephen H. Shore 
Strategic Trading and Manipulation with Spot 
Market Power 
2006/06  Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Frank A. Schmid 
Erik Theissen 
Investment Performance and Market Share: A 
Study of the German Mutual Fund Industry 
2006/05  Jan Pieter Krahnen  Die Stabilität von Finanzmärkten: Wie kann die 
Wirtschaftspolitik Vertrauen schaffen? 
2006/04  Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Christian Wilde 
Risk Transfer with CDOs and Systemic Risk in 
Banking 
2006/03  Panos Parpas 
Berc Rustem 
Volker Wieland 
Stan Zakovic 
Mean Variance Optimization of Non–Linear 
Systems and Worst–case Analysis 
2006/02  Christoffer Carroll 
Miles S. Kimball 
Precautionary Saving and Precautionary Wealth 
2006/01  M. Hashem Pesaran  Market Efficiency Today 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  